@treeship/verify

@treeship/verify is the verification-only npm package Witness, dashboards, browser viewers, and any third-party consumer embedding Treeship verification installs. Zero dependency on @treeship/sdk, zero subprocess. Only dependency is @treeship/core-wasm (the compiled Rust core, under 170 KB gzipped).

Everything treeship verify --format json produces on the CLI, @treeship/verify produces in-process, anywhere WebAssembly and fetch are available.

Install

npm install @treeship/verify

Runtime support

WebAssembly.Table.grow(): failed to grow table by 4

Same verification semantics in every runtime. The package ships with @treeship/core-wasm pinned to an exact version (no caret), so there is no silent drift between the WASM you install and the rules this package documents.

Trust roots

Certificate-bearing checks (verifyCertificate, crossVerify, verifyCapability) take a trustRoots argument, and fail closed without it. As of the v0.10.3 trust-root audit fix, a certificate is never accepted on its embedded public key alone — that would make every certificate self-signed. You pin which issuer keys may vouch for agents; any other issuer is rejected.

trustRoots accepts the same JSON shape the CLI stores in ~/.treeship/trust_roots.json, or a plain array:

import type { TrustRootInput } from '@treeship/verify';

const trustRoots: TrustRootInput[] = [
  {
    key_id: 'key_8a3f...',
    public_key: 'ed25519:LnR1c3Rl...',   // base64url, no padding
    kind: 'agent_cert',
    label: 'our cert issuer',
  },
];

kind is one of the v0.19 split trust kinds: 'hub_checkpoint' | 'hub_org' | 'cert_issuer' | 'revoker' | 'agent_cert' | 'session_host'. (The old single ship kind is deprecated and inert — no verifier honors it.)

Omitting trustRoots is allowed by the types, but the result is a deliberate fail-closed verdict — useful only for diagnostic UIs that want to show why a certificate can't be trusted yet.

API

Four functions. Each accepts a parsed object, a JSON string, or a URL.

verifyReceipt(target)

Runs the JSON-level checks a Session Receipt carries: Merkle root recomputation, inclusion proof verification, leaf-count parity, timeline ordering, chain linkage.

import { verifyReceipt } from '@treeship/verify';

const result = await verifyReceipt('https://treeship.dev/receipt/ssn_abc');

if (result.outcome === 'structural-pass') {
  console.log(`session ${result.session.id} is structurally consistent`);
  console.log('note: signatures and issuer are NOT verified from a fetched receipt');
} else {
  console.log(`verification failed:`, result.checks.filter(c => c.status === 'fail'));
}

Returns VerifyReceiptResult:

{
  outcome: 'pass' | 'structural-pass' | 'fail' | 'error';
  checks: { step: string; status: 'pass' | 'fail' | 'warn'; detail: string }[];
  session: {
    id: string;
    ship_id?: string;
    schema_version?: string;
    agent: string;
    duration_ms?: number;
    actions: number;
  };
  error_code?: string;
  message?: string;
}

verifyCertificate(target, now?, trustRoots?)

Verifies the Ed25519 signature on an Agent Certificate against an issuer key you pin via trustRoots. With now supplied (Date or RFC 3339 string), also classifies the validity window.

import { verifyCertificate } from '@treeship/verify';

const result = await verifyCertificate(cert, new Date(), trustRoots);

if (result.outcome === 'pass' && result.validity === 'valid') {
  console.log(`${result.certificate.agent_name} is authorized`);
}

trustRoots is required for the signature to be accepted — without it the check fails closed. Omit now (or pass undefined) for signature-only checks (validity: 'not_checked').

crossVerify(receipt, certificate, now?, trustRoots?)

Answers three questions at once: do the receipt and certificate reference the same ship, was the certificate valid at now, was every tool the session called authorized by the certificate. The ok field is the roll-up. now defaults to the current time; trustRoots is required for the certificate's signature to be accepted.

import { crossVerify } from '@treeship/verify';

const result = await crossVerify(receiptUrl, certUrl, undefined, trustRoots);

if (result.ok) {
  console.log('complete trust loop verified');
} else {
  console.log('ship_id:', result.ship_id_status);
  console.log('cert:', result.certificate_status);
  console.log('unauthorized tools:', result.unauthorized_tool_calls);
}

See Cross-verification for the full semantics.

verifyCapability(card, actions, trustRoots?)

Verifies an agent_card.v1 capability card and cross-checks a set of action envelopes against it — the same check treeship verify-capability runs on the CLI (shared Rust logic). trustRoots is required for key_bound to be true; without a pinned issuer the card is reported self-asserted.

import { verifyCapability } from '@treeship/verify';

const result = await verifyCapability(card, actionEnvelopes, trustRoots);

if (result.status === 'verified') {
  console.log(`${result.agent}: ${result.in_scope} in-scope actions, key-bound`);
} else if (result.status === 'self-asserted') {
  console.log('card signature ok, but issuer is not in your trust roots');
} else {
  console.log('violations:', result.violations);
}

Returns CapabilityVerifyResult: { outcome, agent?, key_bound?, declared_tools?, in_scope?, out_of_scope?, violations?, status? } where status is 'verified' | 'self-asserted' | 'violations'.

Runtime compatibility

See the edge runtime guide for deployable examples on each target.

Input shapes

All four functions accept four target forms:

What this package is NOT

• Not an attestation SDK. For signing artifacts, session management, Hub push/pull, or agent registration, use @treeship/sdk which shells out to the treeship CLI.
• Not a trust anchor. Certificates are only accepted against issuer keys you pin via trustRoots — never against the certificate's own embedded key. Deciding which issuers to trust is the caller's responsibility; the package just fails closed until you decide.
• Not a drop-in for local-chain verification. Some signature verification needs the original envelope bytes, which a URL-fetched receipt does not carry. Use treeship verify <artifact-id> on the CLI for that.

Schema versioning

@treeship/verify picks up schema versioning from the WASM core without any API surface change here. A receipt emitted with schema_version: "1" verifies under v1 rules; a pre-v0.9.0 receipt with no field verifies under legacy rules. See Schema versioning for the full story.