Command matrix (generated) -- Treeship

Every visible treeship command, argument, and flag — generated from the binary's own help output.

This page is generated from the CLI's own --help output, so it cannot drift from the binary. For narrative documentation and examples, use the hand-written pages in this section; when they disagree with this page, this page is right and the other page has a bug.

Global flags on every command: --config <PATH>, --format <text|json>, --quiet, --no-color.

`treeship quickstart`

Guided first-time setup in 90 seconds

treeship quickstart [OPTIONS]

`treeship init`

Set up a new Treeship -- generates a keypair and config

treeship init [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--name <NAME>`	Human-readable name for this ship (optional)
`--template <TEMPLATE>`	Apply a trust template (name or file path)
`--force`	Overwrite an existing config
`--global`	Explicitly target the user-global keystore (`~/.treeship/`)

`treeship add`

Auto-detect and instrument installed AI agent frameworks

treeship add [OPTIONS] [AGENTS]...

Argument	Description
`[AGENTS]...`	Specific agent frameworks to instrument (e.g. claude-code hermes)

Option	Description
`--all`	Instrument all detected agents without prompting
`--dry-run`	Show what would be done without making changes
`--discover`	Read-only: list every detected agent with surface, connection, coverage and confidence -- without modifying any config. Honors the global --format flag (text or json)

`treeship wrap`

Wrap any command -- run it and attest the execution

treeship wrap [OPTIONS] -- <CMD>...

Argument	Description
`<CMD>...`	The command to run (everything after --)

Option	Description
`--actor <URI>`	Actor URI (default: ship://<your-ship-id>)
`--action <LABEL>`	Action label (default: executable name)
`--parent <ID>`	Parent artifact ID -- links this into a chain
`--push`	Push the artifact to Hub immediately after attesting

`treeship attest`

Sign an attestation artifact

treeship attest [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship attest action`

Record that an actor performed an action

treeship attest action [OPTIONS] --actor <URI> --action <LABEL>

Option	Description
`--actor <URI>`	Actor URI -- who performed the action
`--action <LABEL>`	Action label -- what was done
`--input-digest <sha256:HEX>`	SHA-256 digest of the input consumed
`--output-digest <sha256:HEX>`	SHA-256 digest of the output produced
`--content-uri <URI>`	URI to referenced content (for large/external payloads). Sets the action's subject.uri so it can be matched against an approval's --allowed-subject scope. Same role as the older --content-uri flag, named to read symmetrically with the --allowed-subject flag on `attest approval`
`--subject <URI>`	Subject the action targets, as a URI. Alias for --content-uri. Provided so callers reading `treeship attest approval --allowed-subject env://prod` can naturally type `treeship attest action --subject env://prod`
`--parent <ID>`	Parent artifact ID -- links this into a chain
`--approval-nonce <NONCE>`	Must match the nonce on the approval authorising this action
`--idempotency-key <KEY>`	Idempotency key for retry-safe approval consumption
`--meta <'{"key":"val"}'>`	Extra metadata as a JSON object
`--out <PATH>`	Write the raw DSSE envelope to a file (- for stdout)

`treeship attest approval`

Record that an approver authorized an intent

treeship attest approval [OPTIONS] --approver <URI>

Option	Description
`--approver <URI>`	Approver URI
`--subject <ID>`	Artifact ID being approved (subject reference for the ApprovalStatement itself; for scope constraints on what the downstream action may target, use --allowed-subject)
`--description <TEXT>`	Human-readable description of what was approved
`--expires <TIMESTAMP>`	Expiry as ISO 8601 timestamp
`--allowed-actor <URI>`	Scope: actor URI(s) permitted to consume this approval. Repeatable. Empty list (and no other --allowed-* / --max-uses) means unscoped; verify will warn that the binding proves nothing about authorization
`--allowed-action <LABEL>`	Scope: action label(s) permitted under this approval. Repeatable. Pre-existing flag --allowed-action remains the canonical name
`--allowed-subject <URI>`	Scope: subject URI(s) permitted as the action's target. Repeatable. Matched against ActionStatement.subject.{uri \| artifact_id \| digest}
`--max-uses <N>`	Scope: maximum number of actions this approval may authorise. Signed into the grant for future ledger enforcement; verify reports replay posture honestly and does NOT claim global single-use
`--unscoped`	Explicit opt-in to an unscoped (bearer) approval. Required when no --allowed-* or --max-uses flag is set; without it the CLI refuses, since unscoped approvals are footguns
`--irreversibility <CLASS>`	Irreversibility class of the actions this approval authorizes. one_way_consequential and one_way_terminal require a clean --quarantine-receipt; one_way_terminal additionally requires a human:// approver. Signed into the grant [possible values: two_way, one_way_recoverable, one_way_consequential, one_way_terminal]
`--quarantine-receipt <ARTIFACT_ID>`	Artifact ID of a memory.quarantine-check.v1 receipt gating this grant. Must be locally stored, schema-valid, clean:true, and signed by a key pinned under agent_cert (the memory provider)

`treeship attest handoff`

Record a work handoff between actors

treeship attest handoff [OPTIONS] --from <URI> --to <URI> --artifacts <IDS>

Option	Description
`--from <URI>`	Source actor URI
`--to <URI>`	Destination actor URI
`--artifacts <IDS>`	Comma-separated artifact IDs being transferred
`--approvals <IDS>`	Comma-separated approval IDs the receiver inherits
`--obligations <TEXT>`	Comma-separated obligations the receiver must satisfy

`treeship attest receipt`

Record an external system receipt (webhook, timestamp, confirmation)

treeship attest receipt [OPTIONS] --system <URI> --kind <KIND>

Option	Description
`--system <URI>`	System URI -- who produced this receipt
`--kind <KIND>`	Receipt kind: confirmation \| timestamp \| inclusion \| webhook
`--subject <ID>`	Subject artifact ID
`--payload <'{"key":"val"}'>`	Receipt payload as a JSON object
`--payload-file <PATH>`	Read receipt payload JSON from a file
`--payload-digest <DIGEST>`	Digest of the external payload, for example sha256:<hex>

`treeship attest card`

Mint a signed agent capability card (agent_card.v1)

treeship attest card [OPTIONS] --agent <URI>

Option	Description
`--agent <URI>`	Actor URI the card claims, e.g. agent://deployer
`--tools <TOOLS>`	Capabilities: tool categories or `family.*` globs (comma-separated)
`--models <MODELS>`	Models the agent uses (comma-separated)
`--keyid <KEYID>`	Key this card binds to. Defaults to the signing key
`--owner <URI>`	Owner URI, e.g. human://alice
`--version <VERSION>`	Card version [default: 1.0.0]
`--policy-ref <REF>`	Policy this card operates under
`--from-harness <PATH>`	Capture the tool set from a harness config (e.g. a Claude Code settings.json). Its `permissions.allow` entries are stamped `captured` in capability_provenance -- read from real config, not declared
`--tools-json <PATH>`	Declare the tool set from an explicit operator-supplied JSON file (a JSON array of tool strings, or `{ "tools": [...] }`). The runtime companion to --from-harness: entries are stamped `declared` with the file as their source -- an operator's claim, honestly labeled, never presented as captured/discovered
`--from-a2a <PATH>`	Map an A2A `AgentCard` JSON file's `skills` to capabilities, stamped `discovered` with the AgentCard's `url` as their source (the agent's own published descriptor). Protocol-level `capabilities` (streaming, ...) are excluded -- they are transport, not domain capabilities

`treeship attest decision`

Record an agent's reasoning and decision context

treeship attest decision [OPTIONS] --actor <URI>

Option	Description
`--actor <URI>`	Actor URI -- who made the decision
`--model <MODEL>`	Model used for inference. Examples: claude-opus-4-7, kimi-k2, gpt-5, gemini-3-pro
`--model-version <VERSION>`	Model version if known
`--provider <NAME>`	Provider that hosts the model. Examples: anthropic, moonshot, openai, google, meta, mistral, ollama. Decoupled from --model so attribution is correct when the same model name lives behind multiple providers (e.g. Bedrock vs Anthropic native, OpenRouter vs OpenAI)
`--tokens-in <N>`	Number of input tokens consumed
`--tokens-out <N>`	Number of output tokens produced
`--prompt-digest <sha256:HEX>`	SHA-256 digest of the full prompt
`--summary <TEXT>`	Human-readable summary of the decision
`--confidence <FLOAT>`	Confidence level 0.0-1.0
`--parent <ID>`	Parent artifact ID -- links this into a chain

`treeship attest endorsement`

Record an endorsement of an existing artifact

treeship attest endorsement [OPTIONS] --endorser <URI> --subject <ID> --kind <KIND>

Option	Description
`--endorser <URI>`	Endorser URI -- who is endorsing
`--subject <ID>`	Subject artifact ID being endorsed
`--kind <KIND>`	Endorsement kind: validation, compliance, countersignature, review
`--rationale <TEXT>`	Human-readable rationale for the endorsement
`--expires <TIMESTAMP>`	Expiration timestamp (RFC 3339)
`--policy-ref <URI>`	URI to the governing policy document
`--meta <'{"key":"val"}'>`	Extra metadata as a JSON object
`--parent <ID>`	Parent artifact ID -- links this into a chain
`--out <PATH>`	Write the raw DSSE envelope to a file (- for stdout)

`treeship session`

Manage work sessions

treeship session [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship session start`

Start a new work session

treeship session start [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--name <NAME>`	Human-readable name for this session
`--actor <URI>`	Actor URI (default: ship://<your-ship-id>)
`--allow-dangerous-root`	Allow starting from a dangerous git root such as $HOME

`treeship session status`

Show active session info

treeship session status [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--watch`	Watch mode: poll the event log every 2 seconds and render a live TUI
`--check`	Quiet check: print nothing, exit 0 if a session is active, exit 1 otherwise. Designed for shell-script gating (hooks, monitors, CI)

`treeship session close`

Close the active session

treeship session close [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--summary <TEXT>`	Summary of what was accomplished
`--headline <TEXT>`	One-line headline for the receipt (e.g. "Verifier refactor completed.")
`--review <TEXT>`	What should be reviewed before trusting the output

`treeship session abandon`

Quarantine a wedged active session without deleting evidence

treeship session abandon [OPTIONS]

`treeship session report`

Upload a session receipt to the configured hub

treeship session report [OPTIONS] [SESSION_ID]

Argument	Description
`[SESSION_ID]`	Session ID to report (defaults to the most recently closed session)

Option	Description
`--no-upload`	Skip uploading to the hub. Compute digests + run local verification, return the agent-native shape with `receipt_url` / `raw_json_url` / `package_download_url` set to null. Useful when running in an environment without hub auth (CI, sandboxed agent, demo) but the caller still needs a structured share response

`treeship session event`

Append a structured event to the active session's event log

treeship session event [OPTIONS] --type <TYPE>

Option	Description
`--type <TYPE>`	Event type (e.g. agent.called_tool, agent.wrote_file, agent.read_file, agent.connected_network, agent.decision)
`--tool <NAME>`	Tool name (for agent.called_tool events)
`--file <PATH>`	File path (for agent.wrote_file / agent.read_file events)
`--destination <HOST>`	Network destination (for agent.connected_network events)
`--actor <URI>`	Actor URI (default: reads from session manifest)
`--agent-name <NAME>`	Agent name for the event
`--duration-ms <MS>`	Duration in milliseconds
`--exit-code <CODE>`	Exit code or error indicator (0 = success)
`--artifact-id <ID>`	Artifact ID to reference
`--meta <JSON>`	Arbitrary JSON metadata
`--model <NAME>`	Model identifier (for agent.decision events). Examples: claude-opus-4-7, gpt-5, kimi-k2, gemini-3-pro. Falls back to TREESHIP_MODEL env var when unset
`--provider <NAME>`	Provider name (for agent.decision events). Examples: anthropic, openai, moonshot, google, meta, mistral. Falls back to TREESHIP_PROVIDER env var when unset
`--tokens-in <N>`	Input tokens consumed by the inference (for agent.decision events). Falls back to TREESHIP_TOKENS_IN env var when unset
`--tokens-out <N>`	Output tokens produced by the inference (for agent.decision events). Falls back to TREESHIP_TOKENS_OUT env var when unset

`treeship session invite`

Mint a single-use, expiring invitation for another agent to join this session (Phase 1 of the agent-invitations spec)

treeship session invite [OPTIONS] [SESSION_ID]

Argument	Description
`[SESSION_ID]`	Session id to mint an invitation for. Defaults to the currently active session [default: ""]

Option	Description
`--invitee-cert <ISSUER:SUBJECTS>`	Cert-restricted invitation. Format: <issuer_pubkey>:<subject1,subject2,...>
`--invitee-pubkey <FP_OR_PUBKEY>`	Pubkey-restricted invitation. Either a 16-hex fingerprint or a full canonical pubkey (`ed25519:<b64>` or bare base64url)
`--open`	Open invitation -- anyone holding the blob can redeem. Opt-in only; required because Open invitations are the loosest setting
`--capabilities <TYPES>`	Comma-separated action types to grant. Defaults to "tool.call"
`--expires <DURATION>`	Lifetime of the invitation (e.g. "30s", "5m", "1h", "7d"). Defaults to 1 hour; the protocol max is 7 days
`--no-armor`	Emit raw JSON instead of the armored `-----BEGIN TREESHIP INVITATION-----` blob

`treeship session join`

Redeem an invitation and emit a pending participant event

treeship session join [OPTIONS] --actor <URI>

Option	Description
`--invite <BLOB>`	Paste the bootstrap blob inline (use `-` to read from stdin)
`--invite-file <PATH>`	Read the bootstrap blob from a file
`--actor <URI>`	Joining agent's actor URI (e.g. agent://researcher)

`treeship session countersign`

Host countersigns a pending participant event. After this runs, the participant envelope carries two signatures (joining agent + host) and verifies as a finalized join

treeship session countersign [OPTIONS] <PARTICIPANT_ID>

Argument	Description
`<PARTICIPANT_ID>`	Participant artifact id (output of `treeship session join`)

`treeship verify`

Verify an artifact or its full parent chain

treeship verify [OPTIONS] <TARGET>

Argument	Description
`<TARGET>`	What to verify: artifact ID, path to a .treeship/.agent package, or a receipt URL (http:// or https://). Use the global --quiet for exit-code-only output and --format json for machine-readable output

Option	Description
`--certificate <PATH-OR-URL>`	Cross-verify against an Agent Certificate (path to a .agent package or a URL serving the certificate JSON)
`--no-chain`	Verify only this artifact, do not walk the parent chain. Only applies to the artifact-ID form
`--max-depth <N>`	Maximum chain depth to walk (default: 20). Only applies to the artifact-ID form [default: 20]
`--full`	Show full chain timeline with box-drawn cards. Only applies to the artifact-ID form

`treeship hub`

Connect to treeship.dev Hub -- push, pull, and share artifacts

treeship hub [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship hub attach`

Attach to Hub (creates new hub connection or reconnects to existing)

treeship hub attach [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--name <NAME>`	Name for this hub connection (default: "default")
`--endpoint <URL>`	Hub API endpoint (default: https://api.treeship.dev)

`treeship hub detach`

Detach active hub connection (keeps keys for reconnect)

treeship hub detach [OPTIONS]

`treeship hub ls`

List all known hub connections

treeship hub ls [OPTIONS]

`treeship hub status`

Show active hub connection status

treeship hub status [OPTIONS]

`treeship hub use`

Switch active hub connection

treeship hub use [OPTIONS] <NAME_OR_ID>

Argument	Description
`<NAME_OR_ID>`	Hub connection name or hub ID to switch to

`treeship hub push`

Push a signed artifact to Hub

treeship hub push [OPTIONS] <ID>

Argument	Description
`<ID>`	Artifact ID to push (or "last" for most recent)

Option	Description
`--hub <NAME\|ID>`	Push to a specific hub connection by name or ID
`--all`	Push to all known hub connections

`treeship hub pull`

Pull an artifact from Hub into local storage

treeship hub pull [OPTIONS] <ID>

Argument	Description
`<ID>`	Artifact ID to pull

Option	Description
`--hub <NAME\|ID>`	Pull from a specific hub connection by name or ID

`treeship hub open`

Open workspace in browser

treeship hub open [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--hub <NAME\|ID>`	Open workspace for a specific hub connection
`--no-open`	Print URL only, don't open browser

`treeship hub kill`

Remove a hub connection (revokes + deletes local keys)

treeship hub kill [OPTIONS] <NAME>

Argument	Description
`<NAME>`	Hub connection name to remove

Option	Description
`--force`	Skip confirmation prompt

`treeship receipt`

Export a receipt's offline-verifiable triple: message, signature, key

treeship receipt [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship receipt export`

Export a receipt's offline-verifiable triple (message, signature, key)

treeship receipt export [OPTIONS] <ARTIFACT_ID>

Argument	Description
`<ARTIFACT_ID>`	Artifact id of the receipt to export

`treeship resolve`

Resolve an agent URI to a verifiable bundle (identity, current card, revocation, provenance grades), re-derived from local artifacts

treeship resolve [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent URI to resolve, e.g. agent://deployer

Option	Description
`--hub <URL>`	Resolve from a Hub over the network instead of the local store. The returned bundle is re-verified client-side against your trust roots

`treeship status`

Show ship state: keys, recent artifacts, hub status

treeship status [OPTIONS]

`treeship verify-capability`

Verify an agent capability card against the agent's evidence

treeship verify-capability [OPTIONS] <CARD_ID>

Argument	Description
`<CARD_ID>`	Artifact id of the agent_card.v1 receipt to check

`treeship revoke-capability`

Revoke a capability card (agent_card_revocation.v1)

treeship revoke-capability [OPTIONS] <CARD_ID>

Argument	Description
`<CARD_ID>`	Artifact id of the agent_card.v1 receipt to revoke

Option	Description
`--reason <REASON>`	Optional reason, e.g. key-rotation, compromised, decommissioned

`treeship publish`

Publish an agent's resolvable set (current card + revocations) to the Hub, so it can be resolved over the network with resolve --hub

treeship publish [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent URI to publish, e.g. agent://deployer

`treeship audit`

Audit an agent's transparency log from a Hub: re-verify each anchored entry's inclusion offline and check completeness against its anchor

treeship audit [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent URI to audit, e.g. agent://deployer

Option	Description
`--hub <URL>`	Hub URL whose transparency log to audit
`--watch`	Monitor mode: re-audit on an interval and keep alerting on omission
`--interval <SECS>`	Seconds between re-audits in --watch mode [default: 30]

`treeship keys`

Manage signing keys

treeship keys [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship keys list`

List all signing keys

treeship keys list [OPTIONS]

`treeship keys export`

Export a key's PUBLIC half in pinnable form, with the exact treeship trust add command a counterparty runs to pin it. The private key never leaves the store

treeship keys export [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--key <KEY>`	Specific key id to export. Defaults to the current default key
`--agent <AGENT>`	Export the registered per-agent key for this actor URI (e.g. agent://deployer). Mutually exclusive with --key

`treeship keys rotate`

Rotate a signing key, minting a successor and stamping the predecessor with a grace-period valid_until

treeship keys rotate [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--key <KEY>`	Specific key id to rotate. Defaults to the current default key
`--grace-hours <GRACE_HOURS>`	Hours the predecessor remains valid for verifiers honoring the grace window. Default 24h matches the typical client-cache TTL for fetched public-key bundles [default: 24]
`--no-default`	Mint the successor without promoting it to default. Useful for staging a rotation for review before the active signer flips

`treeship trust`

Manage pinned trust roots (issuer keys)

treeship trust [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship trust list`

List every pinned trust root

treeship trust list [OPTIONS]

`treeship trust add`

Add or replace a trust root

treeship trust add [OPTIONS] --kind <KIND> <KEY_ID> <PUBLIC_KEY>

Argument	Description
`<KEY_ID>`	Identifier for this root. Matches the existing key_id format but human-readable labels are accepted
`<PUBLIC_KEY>`	Ed25519 public key. Either `ed25519:<base64url>` or bare base64url

Option	Description
`--kind <KIND>`	What this root is allowed to verify [possible values: hub_checkpoint, ship, agent_cert, session_host]
`--label <LABEL>`	Optional human-readable label. Shown by `treeship trust list`
`--yes`	Skip the interactive confirmation prompt. Required for non-interactive use (CI, scripts, JSON output mode)

`treeship trust remove`

Remove a trust root by key_id (across all kinds)

treeship trust remove [OPTIONS] <KEY_ID>

Argument	Description
`<KEY_ID>`	Identifier to remove. Removes every entry with this `key_id` regardless of kind

Option	Description
`--yes`	Skip the interactive confirmation prompt. Required for non-interactive use (CI, scripts, JSON output mode)

`treeship log`

View receipt log

treeship log [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--follow`	Watch for new receipts in real time
`--tail <TAIL>`	Number of recent receipts to show [default: 20]

`treeship package`

Inspect and verify .treeship session packages

treeship package [OPTIONS] <COMMAND>

`treeship package inspect`

Inspect a .treeship session package

treeship package inspect [OPTIONS] <PATH>

Argument	Description
`<PATH>`	Path to the .treeship package directory

`treeship package verify`

Verify a .treeship session package

treeship package verify [OPTIONS] <PATH>

Argument	Description
`<PATH>`	Path to the .treeship package directory

Option	Description
`--strict`	Promote approval-evidence warnings (missing journal records, included-checkpoint anomalies) to verification failures. Existing receipt-determinism / event-log warnings are unchanged

`treeship onboard`

Onboard an agent end to end in one command: register it with its own key, mint its capability card, optionally publish + anchor to the attached Hub, and print the trust bundle a counterparty runs to verify it. Idempotent -- safe to run on every agent boot

treeship onboard [OPTIONS] <NAME>

Argument	Description
`<NAME>`	Agent name or agent:// URI (normalized either way)

Option	Description
`--from-harness <PATH>`	Harness config (e.g. a Claude Code settings.json) whose permissions.allow list is captured as the capability set
`--tools-json <PATH>`	Operator-declared capability list (JSON array or { "tools": [...] })
`--from-a2a <PATH>`	A2A AgentCard JSON whose skills become `discovered` capabilities
`--tools <TOOLS>`	Capabilities: tool categories or family.* globs (comma-separated)
`--models <MODELS>`	Models the agent uses (comma-separated)
`--description <TEXT>`	Agent description
`--publish`	Also publish the agent + checkpoint + anchor to the attached Hub

`treeship present`

Package an agent's proof into a file it can hand to any counterparty: current card + certificate chain + known revocations + a Merkle staple (checkpoint + inclusion proof). The counterparty verifies it fully offline with verify-presentation — no registry in the loop

treeship present [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent name or agent:// URI

Option	Description
`--out <PATH>`	Output path (default: <name>.presentation.json)
`--challenge <NONCE>`	Sign the verifier's nonce with the agent's own key (the handshake: proves live key control, not just the record). Requires --own-key
`--disclose <CAPS>`	Reveal only these capabilities, hiding the rest (selective disclosure). Comma-separated tool names that must appear in the agent's card. The presentation carries a re-signed, digests-only card plus openings for only the named capabilities; the others stay opaque. A disclosed presentation is not transparency-anchored (an ephemeral, privacy- preserving re-sign), so it omits the Merkle staple

`treeship verify-presentation`

Verify a presentation file fully offline against YOUR trust roots: leaf pin or certificate-chain walk to a pinned ship root, authorized revocations honored, staple checkpoint + inclusion re-verified, and freshness reported as an explicit bound

treeship verify-presentation [OPTIONS] <PATH>

Argument	Description
`<PATH>`	Path to a .presentation.json file

Option	Description
`--max-staple-age <DURATION>`	Reject staples older than this (30s, 15m, 2h, 1d). Unset = report the age without enforcing
`--challenge <NONCE>`	The nonce YOU issued for this handshake. The presentation's challenge response must answer exactly this nonce, signed by the card's key

`treeship history`

An agent's work history: its transparency log filtered to signed session.v1 records, sortable and filterable. Each record's envelope is re-verified on this machine; anchored entries' Merkle inclusion is re-proved offline. History proves what was recorded, never everything that happened

treeship history [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent name or agent:// URI

Option	Description
`--hub <URL>`	Pull history from a Hub instead of the local store
`--class <CLASS>`	Only records with this attestation class (self \| runtime \| countersigned)
`--since <TIMESTAMP>`	Only records closed at or after this RFC 3339 timestamp
`--limit <N>`	Maximum records to show (newest first) [default: 50]

`treeship profile`

A derived, checkpoint-pinned track record over an agent's work history. Every number recomputes from the log at the pinned checkpoint: match grades the profile checked; mismatch is a provable lie. --attest signs it as a ship claim

treeship profile [OPTIONS] <AGENT>

Argument	Description
`<AGENT>`	Agent name or agent:// URI

Option	Description
`--attest`	Sign the computed profile as a profile.v1 receipt (ship claim)

`treeship verify-profile`

Recompute an attested profile.v1 from the log at its pinned checkpoint and compare, field by field. checked or MISMATCH

treeship verify-profile [OPTIONS] <ID>

Argument	Description
`<ID>`	profile.v1 artifact id

`treeship match`

Find agents by their EXERCISED evidence: which agents actually ran tools matching a glob, ranked by verified session count. The hub proposes candidates from its index; every record is re-verified on this machine against your trust roots

treeship match [OPTIONS] --hub <URL> --exercised <GLOB>

Option	Description
`--hub <URL>`	Hub to query
`--exercised <GLOB>`	Tool glob the agent must have exercised (e.g. "payments.*")
`--class <CLASS>`	Only sessions with this attestation class (self \| runtime \| countersigned)
`--min-sessions <N>`	Minimum matching sessions a candidate must have [default: 1]

`treeship setup`

Guided first-run setup -- detect agents, draft cards, instrument, smoke verify

treeship setup [OPTIONS]

Option	Description
`--yes`	Skip the confirmation prompt before instrumenting
`--skip-smoke`	Skip the smoke verification pass after instrumentation
`--no-instrument`	Detect + draft cards only -- do not modify any agent config files