present / verify-presentation

Usage

treeship present <AGENT> [--out <path>] [--challenge <nonce>]
treeship verify-presentation <PATH> [--max-staple-age <duration>] [--challenge <nonce>]

present

Writes one file containing everything a counterparty needs to verify the agent offline: the current capability card, the certificate chain to its ship, any known revocations referencing the card (included, never filtered, the verifier judges their authority), and the Merkle staple, the latest signed checkpoint plus the card's inclusion proof, computed over the tree exactly as it was at that checkpoint and root-cross-checked before anything is written.

treeship present agent://deployer
# → deployer.presentation.json

If the current card is newer than the latest checkpoint, present refuses and tells you to run treeship checkpoint first, a staple that does not verify is worse than none.

--challenge <nonce>: answer a handshake

Signs the verifier's nonce with the agent's own key over a canonical that binds the agent URI, the exact card, the nonce, and a timestamp. Requires a per-agent key (agent register --own-key); there is deliberately no fallback to the ship key, that would prove the operator is present while claiming the agent is.

verify-presentation

Re-verifies everything against your trust roots, no network required:

✓ presentation
  signature:   verified (chain to pinned ship root)
  key-bound:   yes (AgentCert via ship chain)
  staple:      checkpoint #5 verified, inclusion verified (9m old)
  challenge:   verified — bearer controls key_… (response 2s old)
  revocation:  none included — current as of the staple (9m old); for currency, audit a log
  status:      verified (key-bound, anchored, live)

• Signature / key-bound — a direct pin of the agent key (--kind agent_cert), or the certificate-chain walk to a ship key you pinned under --kind cert_issuer (see The Agent Handshake). The old single ship kind is deprecated and inert.
• Staple — checkpoint signature checked against your hub_checkpoint roots; the card's inclusion re-proved offline. --max-staple-age 30s|15m|2h|1d turns your freshness tolerance into an enforced verdict (STALE past it; unknown age fails closed under a bound).
• Challenge — pass the nonce you issued; the response is checked only against the key the card verification itself established. A replayed response reports answers a DIFFERENT challenge (replay?).
• Revocation — authorized revocations (the card's own key, or a ship key pinned under --kind revoker) flip the status to REVOKED. Absence is honestly bounded: current as of the staple.